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In India, solid waste management (SWM) is a function obliga-tory on the urban local body (ULB). It is estimated by theNational Institute of Urban Affairs that 20 to 50 per cent of
a civic body’s budget is spent on SWM [Devi 2001]. However,
SWM by ULBs has been found to be largely unsatisfactory
because of their poor financial health, institutional weakness,
improper technology and lack of infrastructure [Barman A et al
1999]. Recent years have seen cash strapped municipal bodies
gradually divesting themselves of their direct roles in provision
of SWM,1  moving towards public-private partnerships as a
solution to their inability to handle conservancy operations
efficiently. At the same time, there has also been rapidly growing
awareness of the environmental and public health consequences
of the manner in which waste has been handled till now in India,
with the recent Mumbai floods highlighting the catastrophic
consequences that can be wrought by a combination of apathetic
urban governance and environmentally unsafe SWM.
A public interest litigation2  in the Supreme Court, addressing
the dismal situation of SWM in India, a situation in which both
collection and disposal systems were woefully inadequate
posing multifarious dangers to human health and the natural
environment, led to the framing of the Municipal Solid Waste
(MSW) (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000, under the
Environment Protection Act, 1986. The MSW rules delineate
systems to be set up by ULBs for managing and handling solid
wastes, along with a compliance schedule, emphasising segre-
gation of waste and its proper treatment through composting and
recycling.
Chennai, the fourth largest metropolitan city in India, has a
population of about 4.2 million (Census of India 2001). The
garbage generation per day in Chennai is to the tune of nearly 3,500
tonnes (www.unhabitat.com). SWM is primarily the function of
the Chennai corporation, and approximately 3,000  tonnes of solid
waste are collected every day (www.chennaicorporation.com).
In Chennai city, there are three distinctly different players in
the arena of SWM – a public body (the corporation of
Chennai), a private body3  (CES Onyx, a subsidiary of m/s CGEA
Asia Holdings, Singapore) and a non-profit organisation
(Exnora), all operating under the overarching framework of the
MSW rules.
This study, using qualitative research methodology, examines
the SWM practices of these three agencies in order to delve into
the complexities of the issue of SWM, trying to understand in
particular, implications for civil society, for people who work
with waste and for the environment. The study places a great
deal of emphasis on the experience of private participation in
SWM, extending its meaning to include participation by civil
society. The principal objective of this paper is to examine equity
(relating to access to services and roles of the urban poor),
accountability (relating to provision of services, and to conditions
of workforce) and ecological safety concerns in SWM, and in
doing so, incorporates analyses of public, private and civil society
participation in SWM in Chennai city from four angles – the
quality of services offered, the conditions of the workforce, the
environmental implications of the agency’s operations, and the
impact on the urban poor who depend on waste for their live-
lihoods. The activities of each agency are examined using these
criteria, and this examination is accompanied by a detailed study
of the India’s SWM policy to understand the linkages between
state policy and ground realities.
Public, Private and Voluntary Agencies
in Solid Waste Management
A Study in Chennai City
This paper explores equity, accountability and environmental concerns in solid waste
management in Chennai city. Through the study of the urban local body, a private agency and
a civil society organisation engaged in this activity, the paper highlights issues related to
effectiveness and equity, role of the urban poor in this service, and the relevance of an
effective policy framework. In the context of increasing private sector participation in public
service provision, and global awareness related to the impact of urban footprints on the
planet, the study brings out some interesting lessons on the nature of public-private
partnerships in SWM, and the role of the state in guaranteeing social and ecological equity
and accountability. It also points to the urgent need for a change in the way the state
itself approaches solid waste management, stressing policy mandates that will enforce equitable
and ecologically sustainable waste management practices across the country. The study is
based on qualitative research methodology, and involved in-depth interactions and discussions
with residents, agency officials and conservancy workers, detailed examinations of
secondary literature on SWM systems, and intensive field observation
of SWM processes in the three agencies in Chennai.
KRITHIKA SRINIVASAN
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Setting the Context
Private Sector Participation
The roots of private sector participation in urban governance4
can be traced to the 1990s when local governments in Europe,
faced with the challenge of decentralisation accompanied by
financial cutbacks from the centre, adopted business strategies
and the partnership approach5 for their activities, including
contracting out their duties to the private (for-profit) sector, and
inviting voluntary and civil society participation in the provision
of services [Elander 2002]. The following years have seen the
upsurge of such public-private partnerships across the world, with
these relationships emerging either as a result of policy mandates,
as seen in the case of privatisation of services and industries,
or as a result of action from below, when civil society, in the
form of voluntary organisations and community based
organisations, mobilises around an issue of common concern. The
public-private partnerships have been seen in diverse fields,
ranging from poverty alleviation and environmental protection,
to the communication and transport sectors.
In India, private participation in the public sector has taken
the form mostly of privatisation of competitive public sector,
manufacturing units, with partnerships in public/state services
slowly gaining popularity as a concept [Batley 1996]. It is argued
that provision of services by the state in a non-competitive manner
leads to allocative inefficiency – services do not respond to
consumers’ preferences, and/or are charged at prices that do not
reflect producers’ real costs, and to productive inefficiency –
resources are not used economically to produce a given output
[Batley 2001]. Batley further proposes that state provision of
services is justified only in the following cases of (a) public goods
– goods and services for which it is not possible to charge in
proportion to consumption, for example, street lighting;
(b) incomplete or non-competitive markets – for instance, where
the investment is so large that it eliminates competition; (c) when
costs and benefits of consumption for those who lie beyond the
reach of the market will be ignored by the private sector – for
instance, in the case of industrial pollution, non-consumers pay
the price of other people’s consumption; (d) merit goods – those
that are defined in any society as basic conditions of citizenship,
irrespective of ability to pay.
SWM, an urban basic service, does not fit exactly into anyone
of the above categories. Waste collection, for instance, is not
a public good as it is possible to charge users and exclude non-
users. However, the negative externalities of uncollected waste,
and the possible inability of low-income households to pay for
the service may necessitate ULB intervention, at least in ensuring
provision. Waste disposal, on the other hand, may require total
state control, as it is a public good [Batley 2001].
In the field of SWM, evidence [Bartone 2001] seems to indicate
that service efficiency and coverage is often enhanced by private
sector participation. However, Batley (2001) notes that it is not
possible to generalise such findings. Further, it is emphasised
[Batley 1996], that in most efforts at privatisation of urban services
in developing nations, the state does not move away from its role
completely – roles only change, with the state taking on different
responsibilities with regard to ownership, operation, control and
regulation. In addition, Baud et al 2001, in Post et al 2003, point
out that appraisals of private sector participation in SWM have
not paid much attention to both labour conditions of conservancy
workers in private agencies and ecological considerations.
The private sector participation in SWM includes decentralised,
community-based initiatives that typically are spontaneous re-
sponses to ineffective SWM by the ULB. A lot of faith has been
placed in the concept of community participation to overcome
the inadequacies and evils of both state and private (for-profit)
intervention in SWM, and these are seen as ideal models for
environmentally safe handling of waste, as externalities are
supposed to be greatly reduced in localised systems. Such civil
society initiatives that intervene in public services imply chang-
ing relationships between the people and the state – civil society
begins to involve itself in active governance, when it takes on
provision of basic services like SWM that are obligatory on
the state.
Evidence [Dahiya 2003; Muller et al 2002] shows that civil
society organisations can be quite successful in managing waste
locally and that they have enormous potential to introduce
environmentally safe practices. Yet CBO and NGO experiences
in SWM have not been all positive, and even the best ones are
prone to hiccups at every stage.
SWM in Chennai City
Public, Private and Civil Society Players
A Bird’s-Eye View of SWM in Chennai
For administrative purposes, the Chennai municipal area is
divided into 10 zones that are further divided into several di-
visions or wards. The SWM department of the corporation of
Chennai (ULB) is responsible for conservancy operations, with
the collected waste being routed through transfer stations to one
of the two disposal sites6 in the city. The conservancy services
in notified slums are provided by the Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance
Board (TNSCB).
In 1996, the government of Tamil Nadu, then led by the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), directed the Corporation of Chennai
to introduce private participation in the collection of solid waste
to enhance efficiency and quality of services and bringing in the
extra resources required for the same. In order to facilitate
privatisation of SWM, the state government, at the behest of the
corporation, passed an order exempting the corporation from the
provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition)
Act, 1970.7 Despite strong protests by conservancy worker unions,
the final contract with Onyx was finalised for privatisation of
SWM in three zones – 6, 8 and 10 – for a period of seven years
(2000-07), and included collection, transport and disposal of the
MSW8  at the disposal sites. The selection of zones to be privatised
was done in such a manner to include different types of areas
– low and high income, residential and commercial, etc. Cur-
rently, Onyx is responsible for SWM operations in zones 6, 8
and 10, while the corporation handles SWM in the other seven
zones. Both the corporation of Chennai and Onyx do not offer
SWM services in notified slums – as mentioned earlier, these
come under the purview of the TNSCB.9
Several years before these developments, in 1989, Exnora was
founded in response to the corporation’s inability to effectively
manage solid waste10  in Chennai. Exnora introduced the concept
of people’s participation in SWM by forming community-based
organisations (CBOs) that would independently manage con-
servancy services in their locality, with the parent body playing
an advisory role. Typically, CBOs affiliated to Exnora hire waste
collectors to do door-to-door collection of waste. The households
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in the locality pay a monthly fee for SWM services. The concepts
of the 3Rs (reduce, reuse and recycle), source segregation of waste
and composting of organic waste were introduced to incorporate
environmentally sustainable management of waste. Another major
innovation brought around by Exnora was the integration of waste
pickers/rag pickers into the mainstream by hiring them as waste
collectors (called street beautifiers).
The notification of the MSW (Management and Handling)
Rules, 2000 brought about a whole new dimension into the
management of solid waste in Chennai – that of environmental
considerations. While the Madras Municipal Corporation Act,
1919, continues to govern the corporation, the MSW rules prevail
over the state enacted 1919 act in so far as SWM is concerned.11
After the notification of the MSW rules, some changes were
brought about in the corporation’s SWM systems. To begin with,
door-to-door collection of waste was introduced in select areas
in July 2003 and was expanded to cover the entire city by January
2004. Community bins were removed from most parts of the city.
It must be noted here that all these interventions were imple-
mented only in the zones serviced by the corporation.
Source segregation was introduced in one street in one division
from each zone from January 2004. Segregation was made
compulsory from December 2004 onwards. As of December
2004, mixed refuse is not accepted by the corporation, and an
administrative charge was imposed on people who do not hand
over their garbage to the waste collector to deter them from
dumping it on the roadside.
Centralised facilities for composting and recycling have not
been developed yet, except for one compost pit in each ward. The
conservancy workers are allowed to remove saleable waste from the
garbage collected and sell it for proceeds. The remaining waste
goes to the dumping ground like earlier. There have been no initi-
atives to upgrade the dumping grounds to sanitary landfills so far.
In the zones handled by the private company, segregation has
not been enforced as the company states that its contract12  does
not cover management of segregated waste. Therefore, as of now,
segregation in zones 6, 8 and 10 happens only on a voluntary
basis. The citizens have been requested to separate their inorganic
waste and hand it over to the corporation worker who is to come
for collection twice a week on specified days. The rest of the
waste is to be disposed off in the private company’s bin or to
be handed over to their collection vehicle.
Efficiency and Effectiveness
The handing over of SWM operations to the private agency
in select zones of Chennai city seems to have brought about some
positive changes, at least in terms of effectiveness of SWM
operations and cleanliness levels of neighbourhoods. The resi-
dents across the three zones, which were earlier serviced by the
corporation, were of the opinion that the private company’s
performance in SWM is better than that of the corporation’s. This
is attributed to better equipment, monitoring and supervision
systems, younger workers and more stringent enforcement of
performance norms for employees in Onyx. This opinion is also
substantiated by data on average waste removed per day per zone
by each organisation during the years 2000 to 2004. Onyx’s
collection rates have been consistently higher than that of the
corporation’s in this period.
However, there is also a feeling among residents that Onyx’s
performance has slipped over the years, with SWM operations
not being as effective now as they were in the beginning. Two
reasons can be suggested for this change: (a) the company is fairly
certain that the political atmosphere13  in the state will not permit
the renewal of its contract (which comes to an end in 2007), and
therefore there is no motivation to maintain performance stan-
dards (b) The corporation’s policing of the private company has
come down over the years, with a tendency to “take it easy”
coming over Onyx. A third, quite different reason put forth by
workers with Onyx is that monitoring and supervision have
become lax after worker unions were formed and gained power
in the company, leading to a direct fall in the quality of SWM
operations.
The last few years have seen a remarkable improvement in the
quality of the corporation’s SWM operations in zones 1-5, 7 and
9. The literature documenting private sector participation in
SWM [Baumol and Lee 1991; Bartone 1991; Batley 1996, 2001]
across the world suggests that the competition is needed for
efficient private sector participation in SWM. This seems to apply
to the public sector too – competition offered by another player
in the field (in this case Onyx), seems to be incentive for the
ULB, which till then had monopoly control over the service, to
literally “clean up its act”. In the Indian context, though, it is
also likely that the recently notified MSW rules have influenced
the improvement in the corporation’s SWM operations.
One major fallout feared whenever private sector participation
is attempted is the exclusion of the poor. Batley 2001, has noted
that private players perform “better” than public service providers
as they are usually allocated easier sectors of the market/richer
areas with easier access, and where waste generation is high,
while ULBs are responsible for low-income areas where collec-
tion is difficult and generation levels are low. Despite allegations
to this effect by certain groups,14 the case does not seem to be
the same in Chennai, as the three zones allocated to Onyx have
a mixture of low-income and high-income localities, markets and
commercial areas, etc. It is, however, true that all the zones are
found in the southern part of the city, though what bearing this
may have on case of provision of services is not certain.
This study also shows that while cleanliness levels are certainly
higher in upper income localities (this is seen all over the city,
in both corporation and Onyx zones), the servicing of low-income
settlements by Onyx is as regular and thorough as in upper income
ones. In fact, low-income settlements in Onyx zones appear to
be better serviced than the same in corporation zones. The
residents from different income groups in Onyx zones report less
disparity among their neighbourhoods than residents from dif-
ferent income groups in corporation zones. Nevertheless, it is
important to remember that Onyx’s payment is based on collec-
tion tonnage (adequate motivation for increased collection), and
that there are no user fees involved. If Onyx’s services were
contingent on a resident’s capacity to pay for them, then it is
likely that equity concerns would be more visible. This is a strong
case for the corporation not to withdraw15  completely from
SWM, continuing to retain ultimate responsibility and
accountability for the service, taking it on as an obligatory
function necessary for public health. The duty of indirect pro-
vision, i e, ensuring16  that the service is available to all, must
rest with the state.
When one tries to look at efficiency of SWM operations, while
productive efficiency17 might seem to be better in Onyx’s op-
erations, when the entire city is taken as a whole, the financial
viability of SWM operations may need closer examination. Even
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if Onyx is capable of collecting waste at a lower cost per tonne,
it must be kept in mind that the corporation acquires additional
expenses in terms of establishing monitoring and supervision
systems. It also has to support its entire workforce even though
its direct involvement in SWM has reduced.18 In addition, Onyx’s
greater effectiveness in waste collection means that the
corporation’s net expenditure on SWM may have shot up, as
Onyx’s payment is based on tonnage.
When it comes to civil society participation, in its early years,
Exnora was considered to be a great success, with most of the
CBO driven waste management systems having a common impetus
behind their initiation – they were responses to the gaps in SWM
services offered by the corporation, often crisis situations that
required self-help in conservancy operations. Exnora CBOs were
able to keep garbage off the streets, and make sure that the
neighbourhood was clean, certainly an accomplishment when one
considers the situation that existed before. However, as time
passed, it started becoming clear that all the CBOs were not
capable of maintaining operations consistently. Conversations
with some residents, who were earlier members of an Exnora
CBO, revealed that the inability to monitor operations consis-
tently often meant that waste collection services were as irregular
and ineffective as those of the corporation.
The CBOs were also not capable of operating completely
independent waste management systems, and require much support
from the ULB – for instance, to collect left over waste, to allocate
space for composting, etc. A strong relationship between the CBO
and the ULB is necessary for effective functioning. The incentives
and support offered by the ULB or any other public body to the
CBO for implementing effective waste management also goes
a long way in motivating residents to cooperate.19 However, it
must be noted that quite a few Exnora CBOs continue to function
to the satisfaction of their members even today, several years
down the line.
All the CBOs studied were in middle or upper income localities
– such initiatives were hard to come by in low income localities,
where probably the struggle for daily existence does not allow
the residents the luxuries of time and resources to work for cleaner
and healthier neighbourhoods.
Out of CBOs studied, those that have been successful seem
to be propelled by highly motivated, charismatic individuals
(women,20 in two cases out of three) who are willing to take on
any challenge that comes their way. These leaders also appear
to have held positions of power in the local community prior
to formation of the CBO. Usually, in most cases, there is a
tendency to look at CBO work as something that is to be done
when one has free time – as an extra “voluntary” task that one
is not prepared to commit fully. When such attitudes prevail,
systems usually collapse, without anyone to run and monitor
them on a full time basis. Muller’s study of the UWEP/CEE
programme in Bangalore substantiates this observation – the
study showed that CBO members are able to take on voluntary
tasks say, like awareness campaigns, but are not in a position
to take on managerial roles like handling SWM operations or
resolving labour issues.
The entry of Onyx in zones 6, 8 and 10 has led to the folding
up of many Exnora CBOs that were previously functioning to
fill in gaps in the corporation’s services.21 Similar situations face
Exnora CBOs also, given the greatly improved services offered
at present by the corporation, particularly door-to-door collec-
tion. In fact, a CBO leader (from a corporation zone) expressed
his concerns regarding the corporation’s attempts to introduce
door-to-door collection in his locality, and said that the CBO
was actively resisting these efforts. It was his opinion that ini-
tiatives like Exnora fostered a spirit of participation, and encour-
aged people to take responsibility for themselves and their city
– this spirit would disappear if the corporation took over the waste
management services, and citizens would stop being accountable
to themselves, and in addition, lose a base for mobilisation around
even other issues.
Conservancy Workforce and Other Waste Workers
The very nature of work in the field of SWM is hazardous
and conservancy workers face constant dangers related to their
health and physical well-being. Previous experiences with private
sector participation in SWM in India22 have shown that the
employment conditions of the workforce in private agencies are
lacking severely in job security and basic entitlements.
In Chennai, however, the experience has been quite different,
at least in terms of working conditions and worker safety. The
private company, Onyx, does not take on any casual (daily wage)
employees, and all workers on its payroll23 are entitled to several
benefits like PF, ESI, paid leave, bonuses, etc. The company
provides regular vaccines, uniforms, protective gear and washing
facilities to all its workers and strictly enforces use of the same.
Manual handling of waste is prohibited. Training is given to
workers on safe driving, correct handling of equipment (to avoid
problems like shoulder or back pain), etc, and any violation of
safety procedures and protocol is taken seriously.
It must be noted here that the experience of private sector
participation in Chennai has been significantly different from
other instances in India, in that here it is one company that has
taken over SWM operations in specified zones, being responsible
for all aspects of SWM except for landfill maintenance. The
previous experiences have all involved contracting out only
certain aspects of SWM operations, for instance, only collection
or only transportation, to a number of small contractors who
operate with casual employees, outside the purview of any
regulatory frameworks with respect to labour. The fact that this
is a registered company, with an international image to uphold,
may have played a vital role in influencing the nature of its
employment conditions.
On the other hand, it is the lot of the workforce at the corporation
that is particularly appalling in Chennai. Only the permanent
workers are entitled to any benefits, uniforms or protective gear,
and even they rarely receive and use24 any of it. The consolidated
workers and daily wageworkers who constitute a substantial25
part of the corporation’s workforce are the worst affected, re-
ceiving low salaries, and absolutely no benefits. They do not wear
uniforms (permanent workers, too, are rarely seen in uniforms,
and often do not receive new uniforms for four years at a stretch)
and handle waste with bare hands26  (injuries are common, as
are tuberculosis and other respiratory problems). The budget
deficits in the ULB are quoted often as the reason for the
corporation’s inability to provide its workers with these basic
necessities.
The issue of permanency is something that is very important
to conservancy workers in both agencies, and all covet a position
with the corporation for the security it offers. Many of the people
who enter conservancy work have traditionally been in this
occupation, and lack of other skill sets and education makes it
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difficult for them to get alternative employment. Therefore, a
job that assures a steady income for one’s lifetime is held at
premium.
CBO ventures also have implications for the workers employed
in them. There are no rules or regulations governing working
conditions in CBOs, and typically, workers are employed at low
wages with no protection whatsoever – physical (gear) or finan-
cial (medical allowances). The CBO has no formal accountability
towards the workers, even if they fall sick or injured, during the
course of their work, making their situation highly vulnerable.
CBOs would just move on to employ someone else, and the
repercussions of this would affect not only the worker, but also
his dependents (all workers in Exnora are men). Working with
waste being so obviously hazardous, the question of responsi-
bility of the employer towards the worker through basic benefits
built into the remuneration package itself, as well support in times
of emergencies, are both critical to worker welfare. This, how-
ever, is totally lacking in CBO ventures in SWM, and is an issue
of major concern.
If one looks at the circumstances of different categories of
workers in the three agencies, a hierarchy of worker well-being
presents itself:
Hierarchy of Worker Well-Being
Permanent workers in the corporation
Workers in Onyx
Consolidated and daily wage workers in the corporation
Workers in Exnora CBOs
While at first glance, it seems like the hierarchy would influence
worker’s choice of organisation for employment, in reality, every
worker – permanent, consolidated and daily wage corporation
employees and workers with Onyx and Exnora – aspires to work
with the corporation, and not with the private agency. The hope
of permanency outweighs other considerations like personal
safety and health, and working conditions, making all workers
in this field covet a position – even daily wage or consolidated
– in the corporation.
The discussions on permanency with corporation and Onyx
workers bring up some very thought-provoking observations.
While lobbying for permanent positions for themselves, they
are quick to condemn permanent corporation employees as
shirking work, and resorting to malpractices like bribing to
avoid a day’s duty. Many workers are of the opinion that the
low quality of services offered by the corporation is because
of this – the workforce is large, but does not work. Both per-
manent and consolidated workers agree that once a worker is
granted permanent status, she/he tends to shirk work. The
consolidated workers complain that they are overburdened
because of this practice, and that most of the work falls on
their shoulders in the end. They are also typically assigned
unpleasant tasks.
The labour activists27 hold that that ULB workers stand to
be displaced by the entry of private players. In this instance,
however, labour legislation has ensured that none of the
corporation workers have been laid off or transferred to the
private company either. Nevertheless, fresh recruitment to the
corporation has stopped, though this has been the case
since even before (May 4, 1999) the entry of Onyx.
The entry of the private agency, Onyx, in zones 6, 8 and 10
has had definite negative impacts on the livelihoods of itinerant
waste pickers who operate in these zones. Just the fact that
waste does not remain accumulated on the roads for long
periods means that their access to this waste is drastically reduced.
Their incomes have dropped over the last five years and some
efforts on their part to find a place within Onyx’s system have
not borne fruit so far. In addition, workers employed with the
Exnora CBOs have been directly affected by Onyx’s entry as
they were left without jobs when the CBOs stopped SWM
operations.
The itinerant waste pickers will also be affected by the imple-
mentation of door-to-door collection and source segregation by
the corporation in the other zones, as mixed waste will no longer
be available on the streets. As the MSW rules are implemented
more thoroughly, the condition of this section of the urban poor
is going to become increasingly vulnerable.
Compliance with the MSW Rules:
Environmental Concerns
Even though Onyx has the capacity and know-how28 to
implement environmentally safe management of waste, they
continue to refuse to follow the MSW rules unless the contract
with the ULB is amended to compensate them for the extra costs
that would be incurred if they were to implement segregation
systems. It must also be emphasised that under the present
contract, there is no incentive for Onyx to implement source
segregation of waste as its collection tonnage would come
down, affecting its profits. Therefore, a revision of the contract
to make it more suitable to the laws of the country is an urgent
requirement.
The corporation’s efforts at complying with the rules seem to
have been progressing at a modest pace at best, with waste
still being disposed in open dumpsites. It must be noted that
the deadline of December 31, 2003 for complying with the
requirement for waste processing and disposal facilities has long
since passed.
When it comes to Exnora, despite their organisational mission
of implementing environmentally safe systems of waste man-
agement, except for two instances, the CBOs do not seem
to have gone beyond the level of waste collection. Many of
them have attempted introducing source segregation and
composting, but had to stop operations after a while because of
lack of cooperation from other residents in the neighbourhood.
Therefore, even CBO initiatives are restricted to just collection
and relocation of waste.
One possible reason why CBO initiatives are not successful
in practising segregation and composting (one of Exnora’s main
organisational objectives), and why they have failed to take off
on a larger scale, could be their voluntary nature. There are really
no means of enforcing certain systems on a large number of self-
willed individuals, other than depending on their desire to
cooperate. Matters are complicated further by the fact that CBO
office bearers share relationships with people in the community
other than in the capacity of a CBO member, and therefore imposing
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certain systems like segregation, or collecting membership
fees may result in uncomfortable situations.29
Equity, Accountability and Ecological Safety
Experiences with Public-Private Partnerships
ULB and Private Sector Participation in SWM
The experience of private sector participation in SWM in
Chennai city has been a mixed one. It does appear at the outset
that the private sector has been able to step in where the ULB
failed to deliver, and perform the function, at least at the
superficial level of collection and transportation, quite effec-
tively and efficiently. Equity and accountability concerns have
not so far become major issues, with the company having paid
a fair amount of attention to worker safety, and with disparities
in services offered to low and upper income localities not being
very stark.
Nonetheless, several areas of grey still remain. One is the
question of financial sustainability of the agency’s operations,
as the system of payment by tonnage definitely must be a large
burden on a ULB that already claims to be cash strapped.
Secondly, the agency’s response to the ecological safety aspects
of SWM has not been satisfactory, with it refusing to follow even
the MSW rules without amendment of the contract. However,
the onus is on the corporation, being directly accountable for
SWM, to enforce the country’s legal framework on the private
agency. The corporation and state government do not seem to
have concerned themselves much with this – in fact, even their
performance on this front in terms of compliance with the MSW
rules is sadly inadequate.
With regard to labour issues, when it comes to employment
conditions, the private company seems to have learnt from previous
experiences – its own, and those of others – and exhibits a fair
amount of concern for worker safety and health, backed up by
policy and protocol. The plight of conservancy workers in the
corporation, however, is inexcusable. The conservancy work is
deemed an essential service, on par with medical services, and
the starkly different treatment meted out to conservancy workers
smacks of injustice.
The question of permanency continues to be a confounding
one. Worker vulnerability is definitely reduced when a job is
permanent in nature, like in the ULB. However, like even workers
admit, the status of permanency seems to have a direct, negative
bearing on the performance of the worker, impinging directly
on the quality and sustainability of the services. The power
relations between different categories of corporation workers
influence task allocation and performance, with the impunity that
apparently goes with a permanent status, and the lack of bar-
gaining power associated with a consolidated or daily wage status,
resulting in unfair practices, and the consequent fall in worker
morale. At the same time, no system that permits casual hiring
and firing of workers can ever be condoned. A way out needs
to be forged, one that ensures worker performance even when
job security is assured. Some work in this front is being done
by unions of conservancy workers like the Kachra Vahatuk
Shramik Sangh (KVSS) in Mumbai, where the union takes the
responsibility of monitoring the performance of the workers it
represents. Their task has not been easy, as conversations with
KVSS union leaders reveal, but efforts in this direction certainly
promise to be a possible way out of this conundrum.
Like mentioned earlier, Onyx’s participation in SWM has
been very different in nature from other experiences in India.
It is necessary that casual forms of public-private partnership
like what exist in Hyderabad and Mumbai be avoided for
reasons of equity and accountability. Further, in any case of
private participation, particularly in the case of an essential
service like SWM, it is imperative that the ULB continue to
play a principal role in setting standards, monitoring, ensuring
equity, accountability and ecological safety, and above all,
retaining ultimate responsibility for the service – being ca-
pable of offering competition to the private player, possess-
ing the technical know-how and systems for effective moni-
toring, and being prepared to step in, during times of crisis
and need.
Civil Society Participation in SWM
When one considers civil society initiatives in SWM, they too
can be viewed as a form of privatisation – informal or un-
intended30 privatisation – in which the failure of public services
leads private bodies or communities to step in. While such an
initiative is certainly laudable, to what extent it can be counted
upon, to take on the public body’s role is still questionable. CBO
ventures still need back up services by the ULB. They are also
highly dependent on the capacity of the leadership to sufficiently
motivate people to cooperate. In addition, in this study, it appears
that CBO initiatives in SWM come up only in middle or upper
income areas, probably because they require a certain level of
financial involvement by the members. Hence, it is neither practical
nor equitable to view them as alternatives to state involvement
in the provision of SWM services.
The CBO initiatives in SWM have been largely ignored by
any regulatory or monitoring framework that looks into worker
interests and ecological concerns in SWM. It is necessary that
even these forms of informal privatisation come under the purview
of norms and standards that need to be followed in SWM operations
as the nature of the work, and the consequences of its improper
implementation could have remained the same regardless of the
type of agency involved.
A point for consideration is that CBOs could take on newer
roles in this arena, facilitating effective service delivery by public
or private agencies, and monitoring the same to ensure account-
ability. CBOs could also contribute by nurturing civil society
cooperation for ecologically safe management of waste, and
by ensuring compliance with the systems put in place by the
servicing agency.
Environmental Concerns in SWM
As was seen in the study, waste management in Chennai city
as a whole requires complete revamping, if environmental con-
cerns are to be addressed at all. Despite the corporation’s efforts
to implement the MSW rules, waste is still being burnt and
disposed off in dumping grounds and in water bodies. It is
important to understand that landfills, in addition to public health
and ecological impacts, have equity concerns too, as it usually
only the poor who are found in settlements near landfills – the
poor do not have bargaining power, and the NIMBY (not in my
backyard) syndrome ensures that disposal sites are not identified
within the city, particularly in upper or middle income areas.
An effective implementation of the MSW rules (the least the
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corporation needs to do urgently to address environmental
concerns) would necessitate the incorporation of enforce-
ment mechanisms like fines. This in turn requires political will.
The awareness programmes also need to be designed more
carefully so that the public understands the rationale for the
new systems, and is clear about the manner in which they
work, and people’s role in them.31
In many cases, people who are willing to segregate complain
that even if they do so, the corporation’s collection systems
do not retain the segregation, thus discouraging them from
continuing with the practice. To avoid this, the corporation
needs to first set up collection systems all over the city (both
door-to-door and community bins) that have provisions for
segregated waste before enforcing the practice. This is particu-
larly necessary in low-income32 areas where there is usually no
space within the house to store waste even for short periods of
time. In these areas, specially designed community bins for
segregated waste are mandatory. The SWM system should also
include regular door-to-door collection, provision of bins for
household use and regular clearance of community bins, backed
by educational programmes to teach household members
how to manage waste. In addition, economic incentives33 for
segregation (like a guaranteed market or purchase agreement for
compost/pure organic waste or recyclables) may encourage
effective source segregation.
It is also essential that conservancy workers34 are given the
requisite training and comprehend the need for environmentally
safe management of waste, as the entire system is contingent upon
their cooperation. They can also serve as very effective vehicles
for imparting awareness to the public as they are the one who
come in contact with waste generators on a daily basis. The
conservancy workers must also be made to see that systems that
incorporate segregation would be far safer for them – incidents
of injuries and manual handling of wastes would come down.
In addition, it is vital that designing of new SWM systems is
done with the involvement of and inputs from conservancy
workers, as they are the most conversant with ground realities
– for instance, most workers were of the firm belief that impo-
sition of fines for non-segregation or littering is necessary.
The concept of user fees can be explored to as a means of
reducing generation35 of waste, and to inculcate a sense of
responsibility in the waste generator. Introducing user fees may
also have the effect of making the public demand safe and
effective SWM operations from the service provider, giving them
the authority to hold the agency accountable for improper SWM,
as they now are consumers in the true sense of the word. While
SWM is an obligatory function of the ULB, the fact that it is
available for free leads most people to take it for granted, and
perceive36 waste as something that does not concern them. One
thing that must be kept in mind when it comes to user fees is
equity – for the poor,37 for whom daily existence is a struggle,
SWM is not high on the list of priorities. The user fee protocols
that do not recognise this may result in their (the poor’s) exclusion
from the SWM system.
Role of Policy
At a larger level, changes are needed in the manner in which
current legislation on solid waste views its management. The
Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000
suffers from serious shortcomings.38 Experiences in SWM in
Chennai and other parts of the country and world point to the
need to incorporate several changes in the MSW rules to have
a truly progressive policy.
(a) The policy’s focus on disposal must change to management
by reduction, reuse and recycling.39 The rules must lay the onus
on a range of actors – the producer, the consumer, the recycler
and the municipal authority – to reduce and manage waste [Gupta
2001]. The technologies like incineration, pyrolysis, pelletisation
and other waste-to-energy alternatives must be given no place
in the MSW rules as they are not only highly polluting, with
incorporation of adequate pollution control measures40 escalating
costs to unsustainable levels, but also remove waste from the
recycling chain that is a source of livelihood for the urban poor.
(b) The policy framework must integrate existing informal sys-
tems41 of recovering recyclables from waste, giving waste
collectors, rag pickers and conservancy workers primary roles
in the resource recovery process.
(c) The concept of extended producer responsibility42 (EPR)
should be incorporated in the MSW rules to ensure that producers
remain responsible for their product till the end of its life cycle.
Often, if producers are required to take responsibility for the
ultimate disposal of the product, in order to avoid costs related
to safe disposal, they ensure that the product is engineered in
a less environmentally hazardous manner, or often stop producing
goods dangerous to the environment.
(d) The MSW rules must incorporate provisions that promote
reuse practices. These can include creation of waste exchanges
for industry and domestic markets,43 and using product labelling
as a strategy to promote reuse and recycling.44
(e) Community participation in SWM can be elicited through
comprehensive awareness programmes, and by introducing
economic incentives for segregation. At the same time, for this,
it is necessary that the rules include stringent penalty clauses for
non-compliance – at the individual generator, ULB and state
government levels. Special provisions for slum and low-income
communities must be made to facilitate compliance.
(f) Incentives for initiatives by CBOs will promote decentralised
SWM ventures. The policy must also make it mandatory for the
ULB to offer complete support for all CBOs that wish to take
up such initiatives. CBO ventures must be required to meet certain
standards with regard to the ecological safety of SWM operations
and working conditions of employees.
(g) The policy must make provisions for community involvement
in public-private partnerships in SWM. The systems that incor-
porate social, environmental and financial monitoring and
auditing of the private agency’s operations by citizens’ groups
must be mandated by the policy. The nature of public-private
partnerships must be defined to ensure that ecological, equity
and accountability concerns are addressed.
(h) While the rules mention that manual handling of waste is
to be prohibited, far more attention to the health hazards faced by
conservancy workers (in all sectors – public, private and vol-
untary) and waste pickers is required. At the least, the MSW rules
must list the precautions that need to be taken while handling waste,
and mandate that equipment and protective gear be given to
conservancy workers, specifying minimum requirements to be met.
Concluding Remarks
Solid waste management, typically perceived as a straight-
forward public health service to be provided by local admini-
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strations, is, in reality, a complex, multilayered issue. At one level,
efficiency and efficacy of service provision have significant
implications for public health and sustainability of operations,
and recent years have seen private sector participation being
explored as a means of enhancing service provision. The aspects
that have received far less attention, but are of equal or even
greater importance, include ecological and worker safety, and
equity in service provision. This study is essentially an attempt
at a holistic examination of SWM, analysing these crucial issues
to derive lessons for policy and action.
The private sector participation in SWM, as in most other areas,
is a difficult and contentious issue. This study reveals that there
is a strong case for moving away from the traditional polarisation
between champions of privatisation on the one side and those
advocating complete state responsibility on the other, towards
a more fruitful partnership. At the same time the overall context
–  liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation and the changing,
in some cases diminishing, nature of state intervention – in which
these partnerships are emerging, gives rise to concerns regarding
the accountability of both the public and private sectors.
The study clearly shows that the public sector, on its own, has
not been able to respond effectively to the SWM challenge. On
the other hand, it also clearly shows that private and civil society
participation also pose several challenges especially in terms of
equity and accountability. Further, it also emerges that the nature
and efficacy of civil society responses to SWM problems is
shaped by a host of local conditions and variables, quality of
volunteers and leadership, and most importantly the response of
the ULB.
In addition, the study indicates that while ecological consid-
erations are slowly gaining ascendance in SWM policy, certain
sections of people continue to remain missing from the larger
SWM discourse – these are the conservancy workers, people who
work on the dumpsites and on the streets, as well as the urban
poor for whom SWM is a luxury that they cannot afford to spend
time, effort or money on. The study points to the pressing need
for an inclusive policy that addresses these concerns as well.
The key lesson that Chennai has to offer is that while crucial
roles exist for the private sector– for-profit and not-for-profit –
the intervention of the state and public policy is imperative to
safeguard ecological and equity interests, and enable greater
accountability of both public and private actors. This lesson is
of relevance not only to the SWM arena but also to a broader
range of concerns surrounding initiatives such as the
“Shanghaisation” of Mumbai, debates around which are
becoming increasingly significant after the July 2005 floods.
As Drèze and Sen (1995), point out with respect to the
liberalisation debate, it is not the question of more governance
or less governance, or of more market or less market, but of going
beyond the market. This study of SWM in Chennai clearly
establishes that it is not a question of expanding or restricting
private sector participation but of going beyond it. It is important
to focus on the ends, i e, ecologically safe and equitable solutions
to the problem of SWM, rather than just on the question of more
or less private sector participation.
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Notes
[The author would like to acknowledge with thanks Philippe Cullet,
Amita Bhide and Vikay K Nagaraj for their comments and feedback
on this paper.]
1 This trend is seen not only in the arena of SWM, but also in many
others such as water supply, electricity, transport, etc.
2 Almitra Patel vs Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) No 888 of
1996, Original Civil Jurisdiction, February 15, 2002.
3 Chennai is the first Indian city to contract out municipal solid waste
management services to a foreign agency, a move that is consistent
with the increasing trend to privatise services previously under the
sole purview of the state.
4 Urban governance includes a wide range of activities in areas such
as social welfare, environmental protection, education, physical
planning, etc [Elander 2002].
5 Partnership in urban governance as defined as “a coalition of
interests drawn from more than one sector in order to prepare
and oversee an agreed strategy for the regeneration of a defined
area” [Bailey et al 1995].
6 The disposal sites at Perungudi and Kodungaiyur are open, low-
lying marsh lands found on the borders of the city.
7 This act prohibits the employment of contract labour system in
the processes of sweeping and scavenging in establishments or
factories that employ 50 or more workers.
8 Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) is defined in the concession agreement
as including garbage consisting of waste from households, commercial
areas, markets, public places and other areas in the concession area;
construction and demolition debris, garden and any vegetable waste,
and any waste arising from street sweeping.
9 Case studies of TNSCB slums done as a part of this study reveal
appalling conditions. The collection is irregular and cursory,
with services not offered on weekends and holidays. The
apartment buildings in TNSCB complexes have garbage chutes
that are constantly overflowing, and are breeding grounds for
cockroaches, rats, mosquitoes and other pests that enter houses
through the chute. The community bins near these complexes are
unapproachable, being surrounded by stagnant water and garbage.
Children use this space as a toilet. The conditions of conservancy
workers with TNSCB are even worse – no uniforms, gear or proper
equipment.
10 It was estimated by Exnora that hardly 70-80 per cent of the garbage
generated daily was collected, and the rest remained accumulated
on the roadsides, or found its way into rivers, canals and tanks,
posing serious environmental and public health concerns.
11 The MSW rules are a part of central legislation, and govern a subject
on the concurrent list, and hence prevail over any state legislation.
12 However, a technical paper on privatisation of SWM brought out
by the corporation notes that while the contract was signed well
before the notification of the MSW (Management and Handling)
Rules 2000, the company had been asked to implement any
stipulation relating to the collection, transportation and storage
of segregated waste that the rules may impose on Urban Local
Bodies (Technical Paper on Privatisation of SWM in Chennai,
Corporation of Chennai).
13 There have been attempts by the current ruling party – the All
India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam – to oust the private company,
citing malpractice like inflation of tonnage. Similar breaches of
contract in the city of Penang have been recorded by Batley 1996.
14 Environmental groups in Chennai and labour unions in Mumbai.
15 Gains of effectiveness and efficiency associated with privatisation
can be attributed partly to the private sector itself, but are
also contingent on the ULB’s capacity to create a competitive
environment with sufficient incentives to extend services to poor
neighbourhoods [Batley 1996].
16 By setting policy and service standards, coordinating, financing,
enabling and regulating producers. Direct provision is the act of
physically producing and delivering a service [Batley 1996, 2001].
17 Refers to average quantity of waste collected each day by each
worker, the average cost of collecting a particular quantity of waste
and the number of vehicles required for operations [Batley 1996].
18 Batley 2001, reports similar findings – “privatisation can mean
increased expenses for the state agency brought about by the need
to manage the private operator, to retain a reserve force, and the
inability to reduce staff in spite of lesser workload”.
19 In an instance of a very successful CBO venture, the corporation
of Chennai promised incentives like lowered property taxes,
roadside gardens etc. The corporation has also constantly

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offered support, by being very responsive to suggestions and
complaints, and by stepping in when the CBO has operational
difficulties. The CBO’s president emphasised that the personal
commitment of the corporation commissioner and chief engineer
was crucial to the smooth functioning of the CBO’s SWM operations.
20 It was felt by CBO members that women-run CBOs are more
effective, as managing solid waste is usually a household chore, seen
typically as a woman’s task.
21 When Onyx took over SWM in zones 6, 8 and 10, the Exnora
CBOs were rendered redundant, as their rationale for existence –
garbage on the streets – disappeared with the services offered by
Onyx being far more effective than the corporation’s.
22 The privatisation of SWM in Hyderabad, India, initiated in 1995,
was accompanied by the recruitment of 3,650 new workers. Their
net wages were three times lower than that of the ULB worker,
they had no non-wage benefits like pension, health insurance, paid
leave, protective gear and cleaning products, no job security, etc.
Many of the contractors did not even pay the statutory minimum
wage of Rs 1,300 [Post et al 2003]. In the UWEP/CEE project
in Bangalore, payments, working conditions, etc, varied among
neighbourhoods [Muller et al 2002].
23 Pay scale starts at Rs 2,800 (the lowest cadre), with annual
increments.
24 Due to bad quality of gear and equipment.
25 7,570 permanent workers, 1,660 consolidated workers and 1,666
daily wage workers. The consolidated category was formed in
response to litigation by labour unions asking for permanent status
for daily wage workers who have been with the corporation for
an extended period of time. The consolidated workers are given
a flat monthly salary of Rs 2,178 (with annual increments), and
were promised permanency after three years in a consolidated
position, but are yet awaiting tenure five years later. Pay scale
for permanent workers ranges from Rs 2,550 to Rs 4,000, and
daily wage employees are paid Rs 108 per day.
26 This is forbidden by the MSW rules.
27 Informal discussions with labour activists in Mumbai.
28 From Onyx’s experiences in other countries.
29 CBO members, particularly women, are subject to taunting remarks
by other residents when they collect user fees.
30 Batley (1996) identifies programmed, pragmatic and informal
privatisation. The programmed privatisation involves policy
decisions by the state to privatise, and pragmatic privatisation is
characterised by an initial decision to involve the private sector
due to necessity, that leads to a growing commitment.
31 The residents across the city were confused about what segregation
actually meant; many of them are under the misconception that
it implies separation of mixed waste, rather than collection of
different kinds of waste in separate containers.
32 The installation of systems that facilitate easy and convenient but
appropriate disposal of waste is of prime importance to temper
any burden (for example, fines) falling on the poor because of the
MSW rules.
33 Maclaren (1991) theorises that the incentive for a waste
generator to follow the 3R hierarchy (reduce, reuse and recycle)
varies by economic sector, with factors that motivate participation
classified as economic, environmental and social. For the industrial
sector, the incentive to adopt the 3R strategies is primarily
economic; for the household, the incentive will vary. Recycling
may be mandatory. For other families, recycling may mean economic
gains. Others may be socially and environmentally conscious, or
may wish to conform to norms laid down by CBOs.
34 Most conservancy workers (and citizens) in Chennai were unaware
of the notification of the MSW rules at the time of the study.
35 The city of Guelph in Canada gradually increased landfill-tipping
charges from no charge in 1985 to Can $ 92 per tonne in 1991.
There was a corresponding decrease in the waste generation rates
as residents tried to avoid disposal fees. The city of Date-shi in
Japan had a similar experience.
36 This study revealed that the attitude that waste is not one’s
responsibility after generation was widely prevalent among citizens.
37 However, it is vital to keep in mind that waste generation rates
increase with increase in income; therefore, user fees can be
expected to be minimal for low income families, and then increase
as one goes up the income ladder.
38 No mechanisms have been laid down for enforcement of segregation,
composting and recycling, role of informal sector and urban poor
has been ignored, focus is on disposal as a means of managing waste,
with technologies like incineration and waste-to-energy sanctioned
despite overwhelming evidence that they are hazardous.
39 It is important to understand that while recycling is an essential
component of SWM, it is not the best option either as most
recycling processes result in polluting emissions. In addition, most
products are not recycled – they are only “downcycled”, as a
portion of the resource is lost as emissions. Promoting recycling
very heavily may also encourage increased generation of recyclable
waste like plastic, something that is not desirable.
40 These do not prevent pollution – they just convert gaseous
emissions to water borne, solid and ash wastes that are equally toxic.
Of primary concern are dioxins, furans, suspended particulate
matter and heavy metals, all of which are released during incineration
of wastes.
41 Effective implementation of the current MSW rules will reduce the
urban poor’s access to waste, thus impinging on their livelihoods.
42 This is a concept that aims to reduce generation of waste by placing
the obligation of reducing environmental impacts of products at
each stage of the product’s lifecycle, including final disposal, on
the manufacturer. This responsibility is extended to all those
involved in the production chain, from manufacturers, suppliers,
retailers and consumers to disposers of products. For instance, in
India, it is obligatory for battery manufacturers to take back certain
types of batteries after use for recycling and safe disposal.
43 The wastes of one industry are often raw material for another;
thus waste exchanges can help reduce the quantities of waste going
for disposal. This can also be applied at the domestic level, avoiding
the trashing of consumer products.
44 The products that pass an environmental life cycle analysis are
given environmentally friendly designation, allowing consumers to
exercise an informed environmentally friendly choice.
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